Designing the Mind: Susan Schneider at the 6th FQXi Meeting

How far would you go to enhance your mind? How far is too far?

Last month,聽Elon Musk's Neuralink start-up introduced the idea of an implantable chip that you stick in your brain, through an invasive surgical procedure (drilling a hole in your head), to "merge biological intelligence with machine intelligence." These chips would allow data to transmit wirelessly from your brain to digital devices.

One of Musk's justifications for this is that such chips will one day enable humans to keep pace as artificial intelligences (AI) start to overtake us. "Even in聽a benign AI scenario, we will be left behind," Musk warned. "But with a brain-machine interface, we can actually go along for the ride."

Meanwhile, DARPA is investing in brain-machine interface technologies to help people suffering from post-traumatic stress.

"The next big wave of AI may very well be inside the head," said philosopher and cognitive scientist Susan Schneider, of the AI, Mind and Society (AIMS) group at the University of Connecticut, speaking at the 6th FQXi meeting, in Tuscany, in July.

The transhumanist vision espoused by the likes of Ray Kurzweil and Nick Bostrom says that one day we will be able to "upgrade" with cognitive and physical enhancements, including increasing our longevity, until we become post-human--superior to unenhanced humans in every capacity.

It's a vision that sounds at once fantastical, enticing -- and also deeply alarming. (To me, at least.)

Assuming (for the sake of argument) that there are no physical risks, and the procedures all work perfectly, what are the philosophical concerns regarding such tampering? Schneider points to a pretty major one: you could end up inadvertently killing your true "self" -- not because of a surgical mistake or because of the chip malfunctioning, but because the procedure worked perfectly and you successfully replace so much of your original self that you cannot continue to identify yourself as "you". Instead of enhancing yourself, you'll be enhancing a new being in your place. How will you know if you are at risk of accidental suicide-of-the-self in the name of improvement? Where do you draw the line?

I've posted the full audio version of Schneider's talk, on the podcast. In it, you'll hear her run through different conceptions of the self and what it means to be "you," that have been discussed by philosophers and theologians for centuries, and are now being talked about in transhumanist circles.

If you identify yourself with your brain, it seems easy to see that very quickly, if you keep chopping chunks out of your brain, you will destroy yourself.

Transhumanists tend to adopt a more subtle "psychological continuity" view, however, which says that you are your memories and your psychological configuration -- or your "pattern." Listen to Schneider taking down this argument, as she warns that even in this picture, you will likely destroy yourself, by breaking the pattern. The problem of identity is actually sharpened here: In some scenarios you could imagine uploading your pattern and then duplicating it, but in that case, which duplicate is "you"?

Religions and ancient philosophies have alternative views, however, it's not really clear what this all means for them either. Your essence might be contained in a "soul" -- but what happens to your soul during upgrading and uploading? Or, taking a more Buddhist line, there is no self; in that scenario perhaps there is less cause for concern.

During the talk, Schneider asked how many people in the audience (of about 100) would be open to implanting a chip that could, for instance, make you better at doing calculations or improve your musical abilities. And how many would go for the whole mind-merge? I tell you the (rough) answers to that poll in the podcast. But I'd be interested to know how you would answer before listening to Schneider's talk -- and whether then hearing what she has to say makes you change your mind.